Bridge of Weir
Memorial

PTE J A MACDOUGALL 6^TH H.L.I.

2426 Private John Allan Macdougall

6th Battalion, Highland Light Infantry

missing presumed dead 16th August 1915

aged 33

Helles Memorial
Greenock Academy War Memorial
St Machar's Church Memorial, Bridge of Weir
Ranfurly Church Memorial
Greenock Cemetery Memorial

Son of John Macdougall and Martha Park
Locksley, Bridge of Weir

His Life

John Allan Macdougall was born on 15th June 1882 at 5 Lyle Street, Greenock, Renfrewshire, the sixth of a family of eleven (nine surviving) born to John Macdougall, a doctor of medicine from Jura, Argyll and Martha Park, from Greenock, who had married in Greenock West on 22nd April 1875.

In 1881 John (42), Martha (28), and four of their children Dugald, Matthew, Mary and Isabella were living in 5 Lyle Street, Greenock. The family had two domestic servants; Catherine Taylor (25) from Campbelltown, Argyll and Elizabeth Love (16) from Bathgate.

In 1891 the Macdougall family of ten was at 9 Lyle Street, Greenock. The eight children, including John A (8), were at school. Catherine Taylor was still employed as a general servant.

John was educated at Greenock Academy (later memorialised on its War Memorial)

In 1901 the Macdougall family, now of eleven, was living in 2 Shaw Place, Greenock. By then Dugald was a commercial traveller, Matthew a shipping clerk, Mary and Ella were teachers, Nellie an arts student, and John junior (18) was a shipping clerk.

By 1911, Martha (58) was a widow, living with seven of her children and the faithful servant Catherine Taylor (54) at 2 Shaw Place, Greenock. Matthew was still a shipping clerk, but John junior (28) was now a law apprentice. May and Helen were teachers of dressmaking, Isabella a music teacher, Janet an elementary school teacher and Robert a student.

Sometime later, Martha, probably with the family, moved to Locksley, a 10-roomed villa in Ranfurly, Bridge of Weir.

John Macdougall enlisted in the territorial battalion, the 1/6th (City of Glasgow) Highland Light Infantry which came under orders of 157th Brigade, 52nd (Lowland) Division. On 26th May 1915, the division sailed from Devonport to Egypt, guarded the Suez Canal for a few weeks, then sailed again to provide reinforcements for Gallipoli, which was not going well for the British and Commonwealth forces. John first joined a theatre of war on 2nd July 1915 when he landed at Cape Helles. He was posted missing, presumed dead on 16th August 1915 (although the Scottish National War Memorial records his date of death as 12th October 1915). The action on the night of 15/16 August in the area known as the Vineyard, was a shambles, with no written orders and no obvious command. At one point a company of the 1/6 HLI refused to go forward, resulting in a 3-day Court of Enquiry. Robin Prior's account (below) balances the apparent mutinous behaviour with the innate common-sense of the common soldier. He believes the men would have shrugged off accusations of cowardice, living to fight another day. But that was cold comfort for John Macdougall who had died somewhere in the midst of that botched night operation in Gallipoli. His name is recorded alongside 21,000 of his comrades with no known grave on the Helles Memorial.

Trench Map from Unit War Diary of 6 HLI. The objective of C Company was Trench G12, and only a handful came back after the failed attack.

Siblings

Sources

• Commonwealth War Graves Commission
• Scottish National War Memorial
• UK Soldiers Died in the Great War
• Wasted Journey, The Buddies who never came back. Paisley Library. 940.467; PC17430: O/S.
• Inverclyde's Great War
• John Allan Macdougall birth certificate, 15th June 1882. Middle District of Greenock. Regd 26th June 1882.
• 1881 UK Census: Parish: Greenock Middle; ED:30; Page:23; Line:1; Roll: cssct1881_164.
• 1891 UK Census: Parish: Greenock West; ED:22; Page:10; Line:17; Roll: CSSCT1891_179.
• 1901 UK Census: Parish: Greenock Middle; ED:11; Page:5; Line:9; Roll: CSSCT1901_193.
• 1911 UK Census: Parish: Greenock; Ward: Fourth; Page 5; lines 14-23. 564/01 009/00 005.
• Gallipoli: the End of the Myth Robin Prior, 2009. pp221-3
  On the night of 15-16 August, about 100 men from the 1/6 Highland Light Infantry were ordered to capture 120 yards of trench at a location known as the Vineyard. The attack was to take place in three waves, each consisting of an officer or non-commissioned officer (NCO) and 30 men. The operation had some unusual features. There were no written orders: they were given verbally to the officers and NCOs just before the attack, and it was 'optional' how much of the so-called 'orders' they took down. In the event, such was the level of sickness in the Highland Light Infantry that no more than 60 men moved to the attack, most of them without the slightest idea of what they were to do.
  In addition, it is clear from the testimony of some of the officers that the men were exhausted from an extended period of trench digging just prior to the attack. Most of the men had also been involved in a night attack on 12 July where no ground had been gained at the expense of heavy casualties. Finally, neither the officer who ordered the attack nor his second-in-command was anywhere near the front when the attack went in and thus could exert no command.
  What happened when the attack went in can be established in some detail. First, only some groups possessed a watch so each section advanced at a slightly different time, allowing the Turks to concentrate all their fire first on one group and then on another. Second, the men had no fire support, the artillery having missed the Turkish trench by a considerable margin. Third, the small numbers involved meant that the men had to be spread thinly to cover the front of the attack. In the dark they were too distant from their flanking colleagues to be sure whether they were supporting them or not. Essentially, each man advanced alone.
  In these circumstances the attack just melted away. Most officers testified that when they reached the Turkish front line they found themselves utterly alone and that if the men had got out of their trenches at all, they had certainly not advanced more than a dozen or so yards. Any attempt to get the men forward failed as they drifted back in the dark. The feebleness of the effort, its want of leadership and organization and the utter exhaustion of the participants had brought the men to the sensible decision that this was not an attack worth the candle. If the 1/6 Highland Light Infantry was anything to go by, the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force was in no state to continue operations.
  In one sense the command accepted this view. They stated that the men were 'not very lively', or were 'lacking in keenness and energy', or they showed 'a great want of energy, initiative and interest' in the operation. There was of course no explanation of why the men were reduced to this condition. In any case, a riposte to the command might be that it was because the men wished to remain 'lively' that they had used a great deal of initiative to survive this sad affair.
  General Davies, however, was made of sterner stuff. In summing up the reasons for failure he commented:
  
  "The operation failed for one reason only, namely the misconduct of the men whose duty it was to carry out the attack. I have not the slightest doubt that if these men had possessed any proper military spirit, the Turkish trench would now be in our possession. The cowardly behaviour of the men 1/6th Highland Light Infantry has brought great discredit on the regiment to which they belong and on the land of their birth" [Scotland].
  
  There seems little doubt about why the command reacted by setting up a full-scale Court of Inquiry - not, let it be noted, into the shortcomings of the plan but into the men's response to it - nor why Davies condemned the men in such savage language. In the First World War men were repeatedly asked to undertake hare-brained operations and repeatedly did so without question. Here was a small example when they had chosen to act otherwise. The command could neither comprehend such behaviour nor condone it. However, the normal response - court-martial and punish - was not available to the command because in the dark it could never be ascertained with certainty who advanced and who did not. It is this frustration that explains Davies' actions in setting up the Inquiry and the language he used in his summary statement. As for the men, it may be assumed that they did not long dwell on their 'cowardly behaviour' or the supposed disgrace they had brought on their country. They had lived to fight another day.
• Unit War Diaries: 1/6 Battalion Highland Light Infantry, 157 Brigade, 52nd (Lowland) Division. May 1915-Jan 1916. Cape Helles, Gallipoli.WO95/4321. National Archives
• 15 August 1915: Quiet night. General CASSON arrived in the morning to discuss plans for capture of G12 & explain artillery arrangements. He stayed till about 1500 after which we started to work out details & make definite preparations. C Coy selected for the attack - Hour fixed for 0230 in consultation with BDE. Coy warned to get all receptacles for water filled at once & to husband same most carefully - Snipers interfering with work on sap W. of VINEYARD which only gets on slowly - Rum issue for tonight arranged with QM - on Brigadier's suggestion - Bombers relieved & reinforced by Coy. bombers.
  Applied to BDE for 2 catapults with parties RMLI to report at 1800. These parties reported later in evening but were withdrawn by orders of Major FRENCH according to their own statements - French demoiselle gun bombarded trenches G and F between 1800 and 2000. 'C' Coy selected to make attack on G12 & DALY sent for & plans laid before him at [blank]. GLENDINNING warned about [blank] that a job was afoot tonight & ordered to get as much rest as possible before dusk. Work on Sap at W. end of NEWFIRE trench still being pressed on & eventually completed about 2250. At 1700 Coys were ordered to knock off all other work & rest until dusk. All officers concerned (OC Coys etc) summoned at 1945 & orders detailed to each in turn, for move to position by ADJUTANT & for attack by Major ANDERSON in presence of C.O. who had previously outlined general idea. Each officer in turn repeated his own orders from his notes to ensure all being quite clear - watches set at 2000.
  Move of Coys to position was altered to 2300 to allow of Sap being completed. 1 Coy A&SH sent to strengthen 'A' Coy on W. of VINEYARD & 1 Coy do: to be ready to occupy DUPLICATE FIRING LINE from our extreme left to Sap 7 - when D. Coy moved out at 0145. About 2400 Sgt JOHNSTONE wounded & LT BLACK took over bombers on right after receving instructions from Major ANDERSON. 2 Lt McMURDO sent to do duty with 'D' Coy - vice BLACK. Recd Brigade & DIVISIONAL copies of orders at 0038.
• 16 August 1915: 0230 - Attack launched.
  0232 - Guns in support started.
  0305 - Major ANDERSON arrived at Hd Qrs & stated "complete failure, only handful of 'C' Coy got back and 'D' Coy refused to go in support"
  Decided that under these circumstances & also as dawn was appearing & advantage of surprise gone it was no use endeavouring to organise a fresh attack - NEW FIRE TRENCH reported as firmly held - Informed Brigade by telephone ms: of failure at 3.15 am. Meanwhile Major ANDERSON had returned to firing line with instructions to endeavour to get D Coy forward. C.O. spoke on telephone to BRIGADE - 0350. Adjutant spoke to BRIGADIER who agreed further attack useless under peculiar circumstances but urged importance of holding NEW FIRE TRENCH at all costs & emphasised necessity of energetic bombing. C.O. ordered company 1/7 HLI to Duplicate Firing Line & then went to inspect situation. 0410.
  No further attack organised & situation gradually resumed normal again - about 0615 Major ARMSTRONG arrived to spend day. Capt C.G. DALY, LIEUT BLACK & 2nd LT GLENDINNING all summoned to give exact a/c of what happened. This taken down by Adjutant. Later 1/7 HLI allowed to withdraw but 1 company kept in REDOUBT LINE until 1345. LT COL WALSHE arrived & C.O. represented men too tired to hold trenches tonight. Final decision 156th Bde to relieve us at 1830 & we withdrew to trenches running NE & SE of CLAPHAM JUNCTION.
  Casualties. - Killed -; 22 wounded; 8 missing.
• Medals: Victory, British War, 1914-15 Star.

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